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Abstract
Gender inequality in access to resources remains persistent in rural areas in de-
veloping countries. To better understand the mechanisms responsible for gender
inequality, we start from the observation that access to resources in rural villages is
largely determined by within-village resource sharing, which is embedded in social
networks. It is therefore important to study the influence of gender on resource
sharing while taking account of the social networks of men and women. To do
so, we combine data from a distribution experiment and a network survey in rural
Nicaragua. We find that sharing is higher among friends and that women have fewer
friends than men. Men share more than women and do not discriminate against
women, while women share less with men. These results are robust to controls for
friendship ties and gender differences in the reporting of these ties. We attribute
these results to the gendered division of labour.
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1. Introduction
Gender inequality in access to resources and opportunities remains persistent in many
domains. Lowering gender inequality is assumed to be both intrinsically valuable and in-
strumental in bringing about productivity gains, improved social development outcomes,
including for children. This is even more the case in rural areas in developing countries
where gender inequality and poverty tend to be more severe and intertwined. It is ar-
gued that tackling gender inequality in these areas has an enormous potential to reduce
poverty, in many ways (World Bank, 2012). For example, increasing women’s access to
resources such as credit, fertiliser and improved seeds would raise agricultural yields on
female-controlled plots by 20-30% (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011). There is
also growing evidence that resources in mothers’ hands are more beneficial for children’s
health and nutrition than when the same resources are managed by the children’s fath-
ers (Thomas, 1990, 1993; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). Increasing women’s access to
resources would then tackle intergenerational poverty.
To design policies that are more effective at tackling gender inequality in rural areas
in developing countries, we need to improve our understanding of the mechanisms that
are responsible for the persistence of gender inequality in access to resources. We start
from the observation that access to resources in these areas largely depends on resource
sharing among fellow villagers, which is strongly embedded in social networks (Ligon and
Schechter, 2012). This implies that to identify the mechanisms that are responsble for
the persistence of gender inequality in such settings, a better understanding is needed of
how resources are shared among men and women, and how this interacts with the social
networks of men and women.
To study these questions we surveyed almost all households in a rural village in
Nicaragua and elicited the network of friendship ties of both spouses in each household.
After the survey, we conducted a series of incentivised resource sharing experiments, us-
ing so-called ‘dictator games’. In these games ’dictators’ could share financial resources
with randomly selected other villagers as well as non-anonymous strangers outside the
village, called ’recipients’. Combining survey and experimental data we explore how the
gender of the dictator and the recipient influence sharing decisions. In a next step, we
test whether gender effects on resource sharing work directly or indirectly through the
influence of gender on the formation of friendship ties by comparing regressions with and
without controls for social ties. Finally, we exploit an important feature of our data,
namely that we have the perspective from both persons in a pair of villagers on their
social relation. This allows us to identify whether there are any gender differences in
the reporting of friendship ties, and whether it matters for the estimation of the effect of
friendship ties on sharing across pairs of different gender combinations.
The results can be summarised as follows. First, we find that sharing is higher among
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friends and that women have fewer friendship ties within their village than men. Second,
we find that men share more than women and share similarly with men and women,
while women share less with men than with women. Third, these gender differences in
sharing are robust to controls for friendship ties as well as potential gender differences
in the reporting of these ties. We attribute the observed gender differences in friendship
ties and resource sharing to the gendered division of labour, with woming spending larger
part of their time on caring of the off-spring and the management of the household chores,
tasks which require little mobility.
Several studies are related to ours. First, over the last two decades, there has been
a burgeoning literature that uses experimental methods to study gender differences in
resource sharing. Many of them used university subjects, and showed a large variety
in outcomes, although contrary to our findings, none of them found women to be less
generous than men.1 A growing number of studies have taken the lab to the field in
developing countries, and many of them included gender controls in their analysis. The
ones that used dictator games, as we do, did not find statistically significant gender effects
(e.g. Binzel and Fehr (2013) in Cairo; Jakiela (2011) in Kenya; Gowdy et al. (2003) in
Nigeria; Ligon and Schechter (2012) in Paraguay; Ado and Kurosaki (2014) in Jakarta).2
Second, another line of experimental research has developed around how sharing is in-
fluenced by social proximity (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Some
of these studies have looked at the role of real-life social ties for resource sharing. Leider
et al. (2009) found a positive effect of social proximity in social networks on resource
sharing among students at a US university, a result replicated by Goeree et al. (2010)
with teenage girls at a high school and Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2010) with undergraduate
economics students in Spain, and recently extended to developing countries by Ligon and
Schechter (2012) with villagers in rural Paraguay.3
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our research design,
including the social tie elicitation procedure and the procedures followed in the dictator
game experiment. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses and section 4 discusses the
results and concludes.
1Whereas some studies did not find any gender effect, others found that women tend to be more
generous than men (see, e.g., Bolton and Katok, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 1996, 1998; Cox and Deck,
2006; Konow et al., 2008 and Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a survey). Evidence on the effect of the
recipient’s gender on the giver’s decision is also mixed. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) found that men
receive less than women and Ben-Ner et al. (2004) found that if the gender of the recipient is known,
women tend to give systematically less to women than to men and persons of unknown gender.
2Dictator games have been widely used to elicit sharing preferences (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, chapter
2). In our experiment neither the term dictator or dictator game was used.
3Some studies have looked at gender and social pressure exerted by spouses or relatives to share
income (Ashraf, 2009; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016). However, with decision-making being private in our
experimental set-up, we do not expect social pressure to have any significant influence on sharing.
2
2. Research design
In this section, we describe the main elements of our research design, which consists of
a survey to elicit social ties, a standard survey that captures socio-economic character-
istics, and a controlled resource sharing experiment. We also present some theoretical
considerations that we will use to structure the analyses.
2.1. Data collection
Of each household in a rural village one randomly selected spouse was invited to parti-
cipate in a resource sharing experiment. More specifically, each participant played six
subsequent so-called ‘dictator games’ with different recipients. The experimenter ex-
plained each participant who was in the role of a dictator that (s)he would sequentially
receive six small cylinder-boxes each containing 20 coins of one Co´rdoba, c$ (the Nicara-
guan currency), which (s)he could (but need not) share with one other named person.
For each dictator the first recipient was a stranger, that is, an unknown but named person
from another village in the region. That the stranger was named allowed dictators to
know the gender of the recipient. The five subsequent recipients were randomly selected
village members.
The random selection involved the dictator drawing cards out of a bag containing all
123 participants. Only after the dictator had finished the sharing decision regarding a
recipient the name of the subsequent recipient was drawn. Dictators were informed of the
procedures before they made any decision and, hence, knew that their maximum possible
earnings would be c$120,- (USD6.70 at the time of the experiment). These potential
earnings corresponded to more than a two days average income in rural Nicaragua. After
explaining the instructions participants were given the opportunity to ask questions and
if we identified that (part of) the instructions were unclear we provided additional ex-
planations. This procedure made that all participants understood the instructions before
making any decisions.4
We planned to conduct the experiment with all households in the village and had to
make sure that the chance of contagion was minimized. Therefore, only one spouse per
household was allowed to participate as a dictator, and in households with two spouses it
was randomly determined who of the two was asked to participate. We did not exclude
participation of the other spouse in the role of recipient, but ensured that spouses of the
same household were not matched as a dictator-recipient pair.
Each dictator was made aware that, although (s)he knew the identity of the recipient,
the recipient did not know and also would not get to know from us who had given the
4We also considered to pay out only one randomly chosen decision, but decided against it because
the explanation and implementation of a randomization device would have been very time consuming
and may have also raised suspicion in our subjects who did not have any experience with economics
experiments.
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money. When delivering the money to recipients we did neither reveal the identity of the
dictator(s) who sent the money, nor did we inform them about how many dictators had
participated. Also dictators did not know how many other dictators would participate.5
Dictators and recipients did also not learn anything about others’ earnings. All this was
known by the dictators when they made their decisions.
This one-way anonymity design provides some advantages over both a complete an-
onymous design, where receivers and dictators do not know each other’s identity, and a
full disclosure design, where receivers and dictators do know each other’s identity.6 First,
in contrast to complete anonymity, one-way anonymity enables dictators to take account
of real-life socio-economic characteristics of the recipient, including gender, friendship ties
and other important factors that may influence resource sharing.7 Second, with a full
disclosure design more motives could influence sharing, such as anticipated reciprocity
and sanctions influence sharing decisions, which could complicate the interpretation of
the results. With our one-way anonimity design, in contrast, resource sharing should be
mainly influenced by (directed) altruism, which has been shown to be one of the most
important drivers of sharing in friendship relations (Leider et al., 2009).8
We organised the experiment in a decentralized way, by having Nicaraguan research
assistants visiting individual participants at their house to conduct the experiment. In
doing so we deliberately deviated from the often used protocol in lab-in-the-field ex-
periments, where experiments are centrally conducted at a public spot. We did so for
the following two reasons. First, we wanted to minimize selection bias. Organising the
experiment at a public spot would open the door for self-selection as some people are
reluctant to participate in public events, which might be correlated with their generosity,
gender and number of friendship ties. Second, during such gatherings mutual influence
among participants is hard to control, and we anticipated that people’s behaviour would
be influenced by the identity of the other participants at such an event, including their
gender.9
To minimize experimenter effects due to the assistant’s presence we employed the
following three precautionary measures. First, all decisions were made in full privacy.
As a rule participants went inside their house or to a separate room and were, thus, out
of sight of the assistant when making a decision. If this was not possible the assistant
5This made it very unlikely that dictators anticipated that the recipients they were matched with
would receive money from other dictators.
6For a similar design see the one-way identification treatment of Bohnet and Frey (1999).
7We could have opted for a full anonymity design in which only the gender of the recipient is revealed.
However, the application of such a design in settings characterized by extreme gender inequality would
likely have suffered from an experimenter demand effect. For example, it is likely that with such a design
male participants might think that we would appreciate it if they showed generosity towards women who
suffer from gender inequality.
8We cannot exclude that dictators reveal themselves to the recipients after the experiment. We will
discuss the consequences of this in the discussion section.
9For more on such social effects in lab-in-the-field experiments, see Castillo and Carter (2003).
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turned his or her back when the dictator was handling the coins. The dictators were also
instructed not to make any comments about their decisions. Second, after having taken
from the box the coins they wanted to keep, dictators had to fill the box with metal rings.
This ensured that the weight of the box remained constant irrespective of the amount of
coins taken out. Third, after each decision the box was sealed with tape. The decisions
were recorded by the assistants’ supervisor (one of the authors) who did not have any
interaction with the participants. The dictators were made aware of these procedural
details before they made any decisions.10
An important aspect in controlled experiments is that participants trust the research-
ers. This is not necessarily guaranteed when participants have no experience with eco-
nomic experiments. Therefore, to build trust, we first conducted the household and
social tie survey. This ensured that the research assistants were already known to the
local people when they visited them for the experiment. Another important element was
the support of the well-respected local community leaders, who at the start of the field
research presented our team to each household and asked people to cooperate with the
research team. By conducting the whole experiment in only one day we minimized pos-
sible contagion effects. We administered debriefing questions which showed that 94.5% of
the participants did not talk about the experiment with other village members who had
already participated before, hence contagion is virtually absent. In addition, the research
assistants were asked to make a subjective evaluation about the participant’s dedication,
trust and understanding of the experiment. We did not notice any problems that could
have affected the dictators’ decisions.
The experiment was organised immediately after the surveys that captured basic socio-
economic data as well as social ties with each of the spouses of the other households from
the same village. For the latter we adapted a survey method successfully employed by
economic anthropologists and sociologists for mapping bounded networks.11,12 Specific-
ally, to elicit the social ties of an interviewee we used a stack of small cards representing
all households in the village. Each card held the name(s) of the spouse(s) of a household.
For each of the cards the interviewee was first asked whether (s)he knew the household.
If they knew the household s(he) was asked whether (s)he had a “social relation of any
kind” with (one of) the spouse(s). If the answer was affirmative we asked to specify which
spouse (s)he had a relation with, as well as the content of that relation. The use of cards
gave us an easy way to avoid any order bias in the elicitation of the ties, by reshuffling
10For more details on the experimental instructions we refer to Appendix A.
11Bounded networks are networks with clearly defined boundaries, such as networks within villages
and organisations, for which all members are surveyed. For a description of the method see, for instance,
the documents section of Jean Ensminger’s and Joseph Henrich’s Roots of Sociality project website at
http://jee.caltech.edu/files/2011/06/Social-Network-Analysis.pdf
12Leider et al. (2009) used an incentivised coordination game procedure to elicit friendship ties among
Harvard students. We did not adopt their elicitation method as it would be too complicated for our
subjects.
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the cards at the start of every new interview.13
2.2. Theoretical considerations
To structure the analysis, we use the following model. Following Andreoni and Miller
(2002), we use a utility function Ui(x,E−x;αij), which depends on the pay-offs of subjects
i and j. We assume that the pay-offs are directly determined by the distribution decision
of player i and that this decision remains unknown to j. Specifically, subject i decides
to keep x out of an endowment E for herself and to give the remainder E − x to person
j, to maximize their utility. The parameter αij ∈ [0, 1] weighs the importance of the
amount given to the recipient versus the amount kept x. The larger its value the more
will be given to the matched recipient. It can be seen as a measure of i’s altruism and
consists of two components with αij = α
0
i + α
1
iPij (cf. Leider et al. (2007)). The first
component represents i’s baseline altruism and the second measures i’s directed altruism,
with Pij being the social proximity between i and j. It captures the idea that people
tend to attribute a higher weight to the income of close others (Bohnet and Frey, 1999;
Charness and Gneezy, 2008). In our setting we assume that Pij = 1 if i and j are friends,
zero otherwise, with α0i ≥ 0 and α1i ≥ 0.
Importantly, we expect gender differences in α0i , α
1
i and Pij. First, there may be
a gender difference in baseline altruism (α0i ). In line with some of the experimental
literature discussed above, baseline altruism may be larger for women than for men.
However, the development economics literature suggests that women may get more utility
out of keeping x than men, which would make baseline altruism actually lower for women
than for men, implying an opposite hypothesis. It has been documented that women
have a stronger preference to spend resources on human capital, such as health, food
related household consumption and their children (Thomas, 1990, 1993; Kennedy and
Peters, 1992; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Yoong et al., 2012;
Dunbar et al., 2013). Such preference may make women share less than men with people
outside their household.
Second, we can also expect the directed altruism component α1iPij to differ between
men and women. This may be due to expected differences in Pij if women, compared
to men, are on average more socially distant from other people in their village, which
in turn would make women share less with other people in their village. Women may
be socially less connected with others in their village, as they tend to face more severe
constraints in terms of time poverty (Blackden and Wodon, 2006) and spatial mobility
(Mandel, 2006; Hanson, 2010), both the result of the existing gendered division of labour.
13In addition to friendship relations we also captured economic relations, neighbour relations, family
relations as well as joint participation in social-public activities. As there is convincing evidence that
resource sharing is mostly driven by proximity in friendship ties (Leider et al., 2009; Bran˜as-Garza et al.,
2010; Goeree et al., 2010), we focus on friendship ties in this paper.
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There may also be considerable levels of sorting on gender in social ties as identified by
some empirical studies (Attanasio et al., 2012; Bastani, 2007; Comola and Fafchamps,
2014; Marsden, 1987; Wellman, 2007; Stehl et al., 2013). In addition, α1i may differ across
different gender combinations. The higher mobility and time constraints that women face
may make it more difficult for them to take advantage of any social ties, which might
lower their importance to them. Also, same-gender ties may be more valued than mixed-
gender ties, as individuals who are similar are more likely to interact with each other (for
a literature review on ‘homophily’ effects see McPherson et al., 2001)).
3. Results
In this section, we present the empirical results. After a description of the study loca-
tion, we present the analyses, which look at potential gender effects as described in the
conceptual section. We will start with a descriptive analysis of the sharing decisions,
after which we employ regression analysis to look into the influence of gender and friend-
ship ties on resource sharing. We end with some robustness tests that take account of
potential gender biases in the reporting of friendship ties.
3.1. Location
For this study, we selected a village located in a rural area in the Northern part of the
Pacific region of Nicaragua. It was purposively selected as it is representative for this
area. The difficult agro-ecological conditions (dry season, irregular rainfall, low fertility of
soils, etc.) make agricultural activities not very profitable in this region. Cattle breeding
is one of the most lucrative economic activities because it is both an income source and
an important savings instrument that enables local people to bridge the long and harsh
dry season.
The village consists of 66 households of which 9 have only one spouse (i.e. divorced
or widow/widower) and 57 have two spouses. This size is similar to other villages in the
area. Of the 123 spouses in total, 61 are male and 62 are female. We collected data
on 58 households (87.9%) and at least 100 spouses (81.3%). Table 1 reports descriptive
statistics of important socio-economic characteristics. It indicates a pronounced diversity
across households as well as spouses.
In panel (a) we observe that 34.48% of the households own land and land possession
is unequally distributed, with the standard deviation being more than twice as large as
the mean of 11.74 hectares. For cattle possession the figures are similar: 46.55% of all
households possess cattle, and the average number of cows per household is 3.55 with a
standard deviation of 9.44. We also calculated a wealth index equal to the first factor of
a maximum likelihood factor analysis using economic assets such as land, cattle and the
possession of tools/equipment which are good proxies for wealth in the region.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of important socio-economic characteristics
mean/percentage st.dev. no. of obs.
a. Households
Land (percentage of owners) 34.48 − 58
Land (mean in ha.) 11.74 24.76 58
Cattle (percentage of owners) 46.55 − 58
Cattle (mean in no. of animals) 3.55 9.44 58
Wealth (index) 0.00 1.75 58
b. Spouses
Gender (percentage male) 49.50 − 109
Age (mean in years) 46.05 14.49 109
Education (mean in years) 4.13 3.59 109
Residence in village (mean in years) 33.22 15.63 100
Visits to urban centre (mean no. last month) 2.07 3.36 100
c. Dictators
Gender (percentage male) 47.37 − 57
Age (mean in years) 44.16 12.78 57
Wealth (index) −0.07 1.65 57
Education (mean in years) 3.72 3.30 57
Residence in village (mean in years) 32.91 15.40 57
Visits to urban centre (mean no. last month) 2.10 2.61 57
Panel (b) summarises individual characteristics of spouses. Average education of
spouses in the village, measured in number of years of schooling, is only slightly above 4
years with also quite some variation. Another potentially important characteristic is the
number of years of residence in the village, the average of which is around 33 years. The
average frequency of contact with the urban centre, which is important to obtain access
to economic goods and services, is around 2 visits, as measured in the most recent month
before our survey.
Average differences between men and women are as follows. Men are on average
5.71 years older than women (p = 0.041, two-sided t-test). This is in line with average
age differences between husbands and wives in rural Nicaragua. Other differences are
not statistically significant: education (average difference = -0.74; p = 0.290, two-sided
t-test), residence in village (average difference = 4.76, p = 0.131, two-sided t-test) and
visits to urban centre (average difference = 1.06, p = 0.117, two-sided t-test).
Panel (c) presents the characteristics of the spouses that participated in the dictator
game. We observe that the characteristics are very similar between panels (b) and (c),
which confirms that the random selection of the sampled respondents into the experiment
was done successfully.
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3.2. Descriptive analysis of sharing
We start with a descriptive analysis of sharing decisions, and how they depend on the
gender of the dictator and recipient. Then, we look at the role of social proximity, by
studying whether it influences sharing, whether it correlates with gender, and whether
its effect on sharing depends on gender.
3.2.1. Sharing and gender
Figure 1 presents the distribution of coins given to the recipient (including strangers and
fellow villagers), disaggregated by the gender of the dictator. For both male and female
dictators we observe large variation in allocations with a dominant mode at the equal
split of 10 coins. These distributions indicate that women tend to share less resources
than men. On average women leave 8.78 coins (st.dev. 4.68) and men leave 10.36 coins
(st.dev. 4.65) to the recipient.
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Figure 1: Resource sharing by gender of dictator
Intriguingly, there is a relatively large share of decisions where dictators leave more
than 50% of the coins to the recipient. Two factors may account for this generous
behaviour. First, before taking a decision dictators were given the name of the recipient.14
Second, as in most small-scale societies, in this village most people know each other (based
on our social ties data, in 93.5% of all possible ties the other was known).
In a next step, we take the gender of the recipient into account. Figure 2 shows the
cumulative distributions of resource sharing of male and female dictators for same gender
pairs (panel (a)) and different gender pairs (panel (b)). These distributions again indicate
14Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Charness and Gneezy (2008) showed that revealing the identity of the
recipient significantly increases dictator giving. Henrich et al. (2005) also observed proposals of more
than 50% in ultimatum game experiments in some of their investigated small-scale societies.
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Figure 2: Resource sharing by gender of dictator and recipient
that women tend to share less than men do, and that the differences become stronger
when the dictator and recipient have different gender, as a comparison of both panels
shows.
Table 2: Sharing by gender combination
women men
mean N mean N p-value
a. All pairs
same gender 9.09 96 10.39 84 0.204
different gender 8.42 84 10.33 78 0.117
b. Same village pairs
same gender 9.19 80 10.55 67 0.190
different gender 8.16 70 10.63 68 0.042**
Notes: Wald-test with standard errors corrected for multiple de-
cisions per dictator, by using a robust (linearization) variance es-
timator. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5,
and 10%, respectively.
To test whether average sharing differs between male and female dictators, and
whether it depends on the gender of the recipient, we use a two-tailed wald-test. Table 2
presents the results. Using all dictator-recipient pairs (panel (a)) we find that male dic-
tators tend to share more than female dictators, in both same gender and different gender
pairs. Based on the p-values, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference in
sharing. Using pairs of dictators and recipients who live in the same village we find that
the difference in sharing between men and women is statistically significant with different
gender pairs.
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3.2.2. The role of social proximity
The fact that we only find significant gender differences in sharing with pairs of the same
village suggests that the effect of gender interacts with social proximity between dictator
and recipient. Social proximity differs depending on whether dictator and recipient live
in the same village, and if they live in the same village whether they have a friendship
tie. While the first source of variation is exogenously determined by our experimental
design, variation in friendship ties is endogenous, and may be correlated with gender.
As discussed before, there are two important ways in which social proximity can
interact with gender. First, if social proximity influences sharing - as several studies have
demonstrated - and at the same time correlates with gender, gender differences in sharing
may be caused by gender differences in social proximity. For example, women may be
less generous than men if they have fewer social ties with other people in their village
than men. Second, the influence of social proximity on sharing itself may depend on the
gender of the dictator and recipient. To get a first idea of whether our data support
these mechanisms, we will look at each of these conditions. More specifically, we will
have a closer look at whether: 1) social proximity influences sharing; 2) social proximity
correlates with gender; and 3) the effect of social proximity on sharing depends on gender.
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Figure 3: Sharing by social proximity
In a first step, we study whether social proximity, via social ties and living in the same
village, influences sharing. Overall we gathered social ties data for 100 of the 123 spouses
(81.3%).15 As explained before, we asked each spouse whether (s)he had a friendship tie
15Our success rate is slightly higher than those of Goeree et al. (2010) and Leider et al. (2009), who
report success rates of 77% and 71%, respectively. Of the missing 23 spouses, only two refused to
participate and 21 were not present in the village when we conducted the study.
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with the other spouse.
Figure 3 shows how the distribution of coins left to the recipient varies across different
levels of social proximity. We observe that the distribution of coins left to friends is skewed
towards higher generosity compared to the distributions of coins left to non-friends that
live in the same village and to strangers.
Table 3: Summary statistics of reported friendship ties
(a) All dyads (b) Alter reports tie
freq. N freq. N
Men - men 22.82% 2,629 28.38% 444
Men - women 6.47% 2,672 11.39% 237
Women - women 7.50% 3,386 17.54% 228
Women - men 9.69% 3,323 17.09% 158
In a second step we test whether social proximity via social ties correlates with gender.
Table 3 reports the frequency of friendship ties. Panel (a) presents these frequencies as
proportion of the total number of potential ties. Reported friendship ties among men are
more common than among women (22.82% and 7.50%, respectively), and based on two-
tailed adjusted wald-test the difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000).16
Friendship ties among men are also more common than mixed-gender ties as reported by
men (6.47%), which is again statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000). The frequency
of friendship ties among women is similar to the frequency of mixed-gender ties as reported
by women (two-sided p = 0.188).
In a final step, we test whether the influence of social proximity depends on the
gender of the dictator. Table 4 presents the results. In panel (a) we compare average
sharing between recipients from a different village (strangers) and recipients from the
same village who are non-friends. Differences are not statistically significant. This is
also the case when we disaggregate by the gender of the dictator. Comparing average
sharing between recipients who are friends and non-friends from the same village (panel
(b)) we only find a difference for male dictators, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level. Male dictators share on average 12.95 coins with friends and 10.15 with non-friends.
Finally, comparing average sharing between friends and strangers (panel (c)) we again
find a significant difference with male dictators (which is now statistically significant at
the 1% level), but not with female dictators.
16Standard errors in this test is corrected for multiple responses per ego, by using a robust (lineariza-
tion) variance estimator.
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Table 4: Sharing by social proximity
Panel a. stranger non-friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.18 57 9.34 250 0.755
men 9.22 27 10.12 113 0.186
women 9.13 30 8.70 137 0.596
Panel b. non-friend friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.34 250 11.43 32 0.152
men 10.12 113 12.95 21 0.034**
women 8.70 137 8.27 11 0.860
Panel c. stranger friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.18 57 11.34 32 0.115
men 9.22 27 12.95 21 0.006***
women 9.13 30 8.27 11 0.724
Notes: Wald-test with standard errors corrected for
multiple decisions per dictator, by using a robust
(linearization) variance estimator. ***, **, * indic-
ate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%,
respectively. Non-symmetrized friendship ties used.
3.3. Regression analysis
So far, we observed that gender differences in sharing are more pronounced among fellow
villagers than among strangers. At the same time, we found substantial variation in social
proximity (via friendship ties) among fellow villagers, which is correlated with gender and
sharing. Because of these correlations, it is important to investigate to what extent the
gender differences in sharing are mediated through gender differences in friendship ties
and to what extent they represent a direct gender effect. To do so we run a regression
with the sharing decisions with fellow villagers, in which we control for the gender of the
dictator and recipient, as well as whether they are friends. Using a regression framework
also allows us to control for other confounding socio-economic factors. More specifically,
we use the following specification:
Yij = α + βX ij + eij, (1)
where Yij denotes the amount of coins dictator i gave to village recipient j, X ij denotes
the vector of explanatory variables which we will discuss in detail below, and eij is an
error term. As each dictator performed sharing-decisions regarding five different village
recipients, the observations cannot be assumed to be independent. In particular, we have
that E [eij, eik] 6= 0 for all k. Further, different dictators may have been asked to make a
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distribution decision with the same recipient, implying that E [eij, ekj] 6= 0 for all k. To
correct standard errors for these dependencies we apply clustering on both dimensions
separately (for a formal discussion of this issue, see e.g., Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007;
Cameron et al., 2011).17
To estimate the determinants of dictators’ inclination to share resources with partic-
ular village members we use the following identification strategy. To study the effect of
different gender combinations we take the allocation of resources of female dictators to
male recipients as the benchmark. For the remaining dictator-recipient gender combina-
tions we include the dummy variables F - F, M - F, and M - M, where the first (second)
term indicates the gender of the dictator (recipient).
We also add a variable that counts the number of coins given to the stranger (Give
stranger). We do so to control for the dictators’ baseline altruism. People who are gener-
ally more generous to others (i.e., irrespective of their ties with and the characteristics of
the other) can be expected to have more friends and, hence, may have a higher likelihood
of having a friendship relation with the recipient. This implies that to get an unbiased
estimate of the effect of friendship ties we should control for baseline altruism.
In a second model, we add further control variables that may be correlated with both
gender and sharing. More specifically, we add controls for the age, education, wealth,
residence in village and visits to urban center of the dictator and the recipient separately.
In a third model, we add a dummy variable equal to one if the dictator calls the
recipient a friend, zero otherwise (Friendship tie). By comparing the models with and
without this variable we can test whether gender differences in sharing with fellow villagers
are due to a direct gender effect, and to what extent they are mediated via friendship
ties.
Finally, in all models, we control for the decision number in the sequence of the
dictators’ allocation decisions and we add fixed effects for the five different assistants
that visited the dictators at their home, to control for a potential assistant bias. In
this way we also control for the gender of the experimenter, which might influence the
dictators’ decision in the experiment.
Table 5 presents the results of the different models. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient
of the gender combination F - F shows that women give on average between 1.107 and
1.420 coins more to women than to men. The coefficients of M - F and M - M show that
men give on average between 1.815 and 2.038 coins more to women and between 2.141
and 2.475 coins more to men than women give to men. Note that the size of the gender
effects is larger in Model 2, where we add controls for socio-economic characteristics of
the dictator and recipient. The results also confirm that men do not differentiate between
male and female recipients. The coefficients of M - F and M - M are not significantly
different from each other (in both models p > 0.371, two-sided F-tests), indicating that
17For this we used the Stata code provided by Petersen (2009).
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Table 5: Determinants of sharing with village recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F - F 1.107* 1.420** 1.392** 1.407**
(0.610) (0.618) (0.608) (0.599)
M - F 1.815** 2.038** 2.022** 2.017**
(0.817) (0.840) (0.839) (0.840)
M - M 2.141** 2.475*** 2.125** 2.144**
(0.858) (0.927) (0.896) (0.941)
Give stranger 0.477*** 0.471*** 0.478*** 0.474***
(0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Friendship tie 1.908** 1.284*
(0.739) (0.710)
Constant 4.485*** 2.579 2.336 2.409
(1.357) (2.561) (2.509) (2.546)
R2 0.422 0.468 0.484 0.479
Observations 282 270 270 270
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tie - - non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at
1, 5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard errors (in parentheses) are
obtained by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and
recipients. Non-symmetrized friendship ties used.
men are equally generous to male and female recipients. This is in contrast to women,
who are more generous to women than to men, as indicated by the statistically significant
coefficient of F - F. Furthermore, while men are more generous to men than women are
to men, men and women are equally generous to women. This is confirmed by comparing
coefficients of the M - F and F - F variables (in both models p > 0.447, two-sided F-tests).
In Model 3, where we control for the existence of a friendship relation between the
dictator and recipient, we observe that the effect of a friendship relation on resource
sharing with other villagers is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On average,
dictators give nearly 2 coins more to friends compared to non-friends. This positive
and sizeable effect of friendship ties is consistent with studies examining generosity in
friendship networks among students and pupils (Leider et al., 2009; Bran˜as-Garza et al.,
2010; Goeree et al., 2010). Importantly, the observation that the size of the coefficients
of the gender combinations remains large and statistically significant with controls for
social ties, indicates that there is a direct gender effect on resource sharing, which does
not work through the influence of gender on friendship tie formation.18
18In the village almost all villagers know each other: in 93.5% of all possible ties the other was known.
For those dyads where the other was not known, socio-economic differences cannot have influenced
resource sharing (although gender differences might still have an effect because dictators could infer the
gender of the recipient from their name). To test whether this might affect the results we also estimate
the models using only those dyads where the dictator indicated to know the recipient. The results are
reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C and are very similar to those discussed here.
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Table 6: Determinants of sharing by gender of the dictator
(a) Men (b) Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male recipient 0.186 -0.278 -0.143 -1.574*** -1.574*** -1.549***
(0.542) (0.544) (0.510) (0.592) (0.593) (0.568)
Give stranger 0.534*** 0.557*** 0.534*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.459***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097)
Friendship tie 2.447*** 1.198* -0.006 1.262
(0.884) (0.630) (1.217) (1.304)
Constant 6.671 6.282 6.919 5.836 5.837 5.317
(4.287) (4.094) (4.188) (4.088) (4.071) (4.265)
R2 0.539 0.571 0.550 0.492 0.492 0.499
Observations 130 130 130 140 140 140
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tie - non-sym. OR-tie - non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%,
respectively; robust standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way
clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-symmetrized friendship ties used.
We further investigate gender differences by running Models 1 and 2 separately for
female and male dictators. The results, reported in Table 6, show that for male dictators
the coefficient of the friendship tie variable is stronger than with the pooled model and
highly significant. Specifically, male dictators give on average almost 2.5 coins more to
friends. In stark contrast, for female dictators friendship ties have no effect on resource
sharing. Female dictators are equally generous to friends and non-friends. This indicates
that the previously observed positive effect of friendship ties in the pooled model was
driven by male dictators in the sample. The results also confirm again that women are
less generous towards men.
3.4. Robustness tests: gender biases in the reporting of friendship ties
In the analysis of the influence of friendship ties on sharing, so far we ignored potential
gender differences in the reporting of these ties. Women and men might differ in the
reporting of friendship ties if, for example, they use different definitions of friendship. In
addition, it is very common for two persons in a dyad not to coincide in the reporting
of a friendship tie between them (see e.g. Comola and Fafchamps (2014)), and men and
women may differ in such discordant reporting. Both issues might bias the estimated
effect of friendship ties, and with this also the direct gender effects on sharing.
We first look at the reporting of mixed-gender ties, for which we go back to Table 3.
Comparing the reporting of mixed-ties by men and women we observe that men report
them equally likely as women do (6.34% and 9.92%, respectively, and two-sided p = 0.160
of a wald test, adjusted for multiple observations per individual). This suggests that there
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is no gender bias in the reporting of mixed-gender friendship ties.
Second, the same table also has a panel (b) which reports the same frequencies but
conditional on alter (i.e. the other person in a dyad) having reported a friendship tie.
This allows us to study the extent to which two persons agree on having a friendship
tie. We observe that it is very common for one person not to report a tie when the
other does. Looking at same gender dyads, we find that concordant reporting is more
common among men than among women. In 28.38% of the male-male dyads in which
at least one person reports a friendship tie, both persons report such a tie, while with
female-female dyads this frequency is only 17.54%. Based on an adjusted wald test this
difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.021). Looking at mixed-gender
dyads, we observe that men tend to agree somewhat less on the ties reported by women
than women agree on the ties reported by men, but that this difference is not statistically
significant (11.39% versus 17.09%; two-sided p = 0.269 of an adjusted wald test). In
sum, while we find no gender differences in the reporting of mixed gender ties, we do find
gender differences in discordant reporting, which is less frequent among men than among
women and mixed-gender dyads.
To deal with discordant reporting a common procedure is to symmetrize the social
ties. More specifically, we will use OR-ties, in which we assume there is a friendship
tie when at least one of both nodes in a dyad reports such a tie.19 Table 7 reports the
frequencies of OR-ties by gender combination. We observe that friendship ties are more
common among male-only dyads than among female-only dyads or mixed gender dyads.
Based on an adjusted wald test this difference is statistically significant (two-sided p =
0.000 for each comparison). The frequency of friendship ties is not statistically different
between mixed gender dyads and female-only dyads (two-sided p = 0.644 of an adjusted
wald test). This picture is similar as with the non-symmetrized ties, but ties are obviously
more frequent with OR-ties.
Table 7: Summary statistics of friendship ties (OR-ties)
freq. N
Male-only dyads 31.72% 1,693
Female-only dyads 12.51% 1,870
Mixed gender dyads 12.95% 3,613
To test whether the results reported in section 3.3 are robust to using OR-ties, we
run the same regressions with OR-ties instead of ties as reported by the dictator. Model
4 in Table 5 presents the regression results for the pooled sample. We observe that the
effect of friendship ties remains (marginally) significant. Importantly, the gender effects
are robust to the use of OR-ties. In Models 3 and 6 in Table 6, which reports the results
19In doing so we follow the practices of earlier network studies (cf. Leider et al., 2009; Jackson et al.,
2012).
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disaggregated by the gender of the dictator, we observe that the effect of a friendship tie
between the dictator and the recipient is now comparable for men and women. Finally,
the negative coefficient of ‘Male recipient’ remains robust in terms of effect size and
statistical significance.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Gender inequality in access to resources and opportunities remains persistent in many
domains. In rural areas in developing countries where gender inequality tends to be more
severe, access to resources is mostly determined by resource sharing by fellow villagers.
To better understand the mechanisms behind gender inequality, it is therefore important
to study how gender influences such resource sharing. In addition, as resource sharing in
rural villages tends to be strongly embedded in social networks, it is important to take
account of the social ties of men and women in such analysis. To do so, we elicited for
a rural village in Nicaragua the friendship ties among the spouses of almost all house-
holds and implemented a series of dictator games played with fellow villagers as well as
strangers.
We found that women tend to share less than men, and that this difference is largest
when dictator and recipient live in the same village and have different gender. We also
observed that friendship ties exert a positive influence on sharing and that women have
fewer friendship ties within their village than men. In addition, we found that there
remains a strong direct gender effect on within-village sharing, after controlling for differ-
ences in friendship ties, with women sharing less than men and less with men than with
women.
These results suggest several mechanisms that are responsible for the observed gender
differences in sharing, most of which we link to the gendered division of labour in rural
societies. First, women’s reponsibility to take care of health and food related household
consumption (including for their children), could explain why they share less than men
with community members outside their household. In a similar vein, if women expect men
to spend resources on non-household related consumption they may be more reluctant to
share with men than with women.20
Moreover, the gendered division of labour leads to more severe time and mobility
constraints for women, compared to men (Blackden and Wodon, 2006; Mandel, 2006;
Hanson, 2010). Men tend to assume tasks that involve greater frequency of social in-
teractions while women assume tasks that require little mobility such as caring of the
off-spring and the management of the household chores. This could explain the smaller
friendship networks of women compared to men. We indeed found that friendship ties
20This might be strenghtened if men spend resources on alcohol or other non-productive use, which -
supported by anecdotal evidence - is very common in Nicaraguan rural villages.
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among women are less common than friendship ties among men, and are equally common
as mixed-gender ties. These differences in friendship ties might then influence the expec-
ted sharing of men and women, as friendship ties exert a positive effect on the willingness
to share resources, as supported by our results. The time and mobility constraints that
women face as well as their responsibility to take care of household consumption could
also decrease the instrumental value of sharing with friends. This would explain why we
found a weaker effect of friendship ties on the sharing by women, although we do not
want to read too much in this result, because of the relatively small number of women
with friends in our sample.21
In closing, we discuss some implications for the design of policies or programs that
aim to increase women’s access to resources. First, the positive effect of friendship ties on
resource sharing suggests that actions that stimulate the formation of women’s friendship
ties with men and women, could increase the expected amount of resources women receive
from others in their village. Second, for policies or programs that inject new resources
into rural villages via local committees or representatives (e.g. via so-called ’community-
based development’ schemes (CBD) (Mansuri and Rao, 2004)), our results indicate that
the gender and the networks of these entry-points could have a strong influence on the
actual resource distribution among men and women. If men are used as entry-points,
friendship networks have a strong influence on the distribution, and women who tend to
be less-connected will receive a smaller share. If women distribute resources, in contrast,
friendship ties would be less important, and women’s tendency to share less with men
makes that a substantially larger share will be distributed among women.
21It should be noted that we cannot exclude the possibility that dictators revealed themselves to the
recipients after our experiment and that this may have influenced their sharing decisions. Assuming that
they would only approach recipients if they were generous and if they expected their claims about their
sharing to be perceived as credible by the recipients, this might have strengthened the effect of friendship
ties on sharing, through a mechanism of ’anticipated reciprocity’. More specifically, one would be more
generous to people who would reciprocate the generosity. We expect this to be particularly relevant
for the sharing among men who thanks to their lower time and mobility constraints are more able to
approach fellow villagers after the experiment to enforce such reciprocity.
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Appendix
A. Experimental Instructions
The experimental instructions are originally in Spanish; text between [ ] are instructions
for the experimenter assistant.
We now ask you to participate in an experiment in which you can earn money. The
amount of money you earn is yours, whatever the amount is.
Soon I will give you 20 coins of 1 Co´rdoba and you will be free to divide this amount
between yourself and another person. For this, we use this small black box [show the
box]. In this box, you will find 20 coins of 1 Co´rdoba [open the box and show the 20
coins]. You are allowed to take as many coins as you wish. The coins you leave in the
box will be given to another person. In particular, we ask you to do the following:
1. Take the number of coins you want to keep out of the box and leave in the box the
coins you want to give to the other person.
2. Refill the box with these small rings [show metal rings] and put the lid on the box.
In this way, I will not be able to see how many coins you will have left in the box,
nor can I get an idea about it through the weight of the box. The weight of the
box will always be the same whatever the amount of coins you leave in the box.
Thereafter, we put a sticker on the box with the name of the person who will get the
coins and we put some tape on it to seal the box. I will give the box to my supervisor,
who waits at the car and who will bring the coins to the other person. Note that you will
know the identity of the other person, whereas that other person will NOT know your
identity.
I will now give you some arbitrary examples for further clarification. [Take the coins of
one of the boxes and use them for the examples].
1. You have here 20 coins of 1 Co´rdoba. Imagine that you decide to take 2 coins out
of the box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 2 equals 18)
2. I will give you another example. Imagine that you decide to take 10 coins out of
the box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 10 equals 10)
3. I will give you a final example. Imagine that you decide to take 20 coins out of the
box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 20 equals 0).
We will repeat this experiment 6 times. Each time, you will be able to take coins and
leave coins for the other person, who will each time be a different one. Thus, I will give
you 6 boxes of 20 coins to divide between yourself and another person. Each time, this
person will be a different one. The first time you will divide the 20 coins with someone
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from another village in this region. You will not know this person. The other 5 times
you will divide 20 coins with someone from your community. Once again, note that this
other person will NOT know your identity.
To select the five persons of your community, I will ask you to take small cards from
this bag. Each card has a different number, and each number corresponds to a different
person in the community. After having taken a number, I will look up this number on a
list and tell you the name of that person. Thereafter, I will give you a box with coins,
so that you can decide on the number of coins you keep and how many you give to the
other person. When taking this decision, I will give you privacy. You can go inside your
house, [if this is not possible, say: I will turn my back so that I will be unable to know
your decision; give me a signal when you are ready]. Please do not tell me the decision
you will make or you have taken.
After having taken your decision and having closed the box we will seal the box, and
you are not allowed any more to change your decision. Thereafter, we will draw another
number from the bag and I will ask you to take the next decision. [Ask whether the
participant has any questions, and clarify any doubts if needed. If there are no further
questions, start with the first decision.]
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B. Full models
Table B.1: Determinants of sharing with village recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F - F 1.107* 1.420** 1.392** 1.407**
(0.610) (0.618) (0.608) (0.599)
M - F 1.815** 2.038** 2.022** 2.017**
(0.817) (0.840) (0.839) (0.840)
M - M 2.141** 2.475*** 2.125** 2.144**
(0.858) (0.927) (0.896) (0.941)
Give stranger 0.477*** 0.471*** 0.478*** 0.474***
(0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
round 2 -0.566 -0.542 -0.613 -0.600
(0.575) (0.545) (0.553) (0.524)
round 3 -0.618 -0.604 -0.734 -0.550
(0.584) (0.594) (0.624) (0.598)
round 4 -0.607 -0.455 -0.526 -0.436
(0.485) (0.471) (0.488) (0.467)
round 5 -0.864 -0.745 -0.843 -0.694
(0.561) (0.607) (0.600) (0.611)
Age (dict.) 0.033 0.036 0.032
(0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
Age (rec.) 0.027 0.030 0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Education (dict.) 0.026 0.004 0.013
(0.131) (0.122) (0.126)
Education (rec.) -0.019 -0.023 -0.025
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Years village (dict.) -0.012 -0.016 -0.015
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Years village (rec.) -0.012 -0.014 -0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Urban (dict.) 0.054 0.026 0.044
(0.149) (0.140) (0.142)
Urban (rec.) -0.080* -0.082* -0.077
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048)
Wealth (dict.) 0.235 0.206 0.206
(0.152) (0.136) (0.147)
Wealth (rec.) -0.085 -0.120 -0.124
(0.076) (0.078) (0.085)
Friendship tie 1.908** 1.284*
(0.739) (0.710)
Constant 4.485*** 2.579 2.336 2.409
(1.357) (2.561) (2.509) (2.546)
R2 0.422 0.468 0.484 0.479
Observations 282 270 270 270
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tie - - non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1,
5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained
by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used.
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Table B.2: Determinants of resource sharing by gender
(a) Men (b) Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male recipient 0.186 -0.278 -0.143 -1.574*** -1.574*** -1.549***
(0.542) (0.544) (0.510) (0.592) (0.593) (0.568)
Give stranger 0.534*** 0.557*** 0.534*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.459***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.096) (0.095) (0.097)
Age (dict.) -0.003 0.005 -0.006 0.022 0.022 0.023
(0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059)
Age (rec.) 0.037 0.040* 0.040 0.006 0.006 0.012
(0.028) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Education (dict.) 0.127 0.099 0.127 0.042 0.042 0.011
(0.208) (0.188) (0.202) (0.133) (0.133) (0.124)
Education (rec.) 0.025 0.006 0.006 -0.103 -0.103 -0.080
(0.086) (0.082) (0.087) (0.097) (0.097) (0.101)
Years village (dict.) 0.026 0.019 0.025 -0.030 -0.030 -0.040
(0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.051) (0.050) (0.048)
Years village (rec.) 0.012 0.014 0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021)
Urban (dict.) -0.079 -0.111 -0.104 0.030 0.030 0.071
(0.174) (0.160) (0.172) (0.377) (0.381) (0.377)
Urban (rec.) -0.109** -0.104*** -0.101** 0.045 0.045 0.055
(0.052) (0.032) (0.042) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
Wealth (dict.) 0.523** 0.363 0.508** 0.212 0.212 0.189
(0.249) (0.250) (0.251) (0.189) (0.185) (0.197)
Wealth (rec.) -0.112 -0.161* -0.142 -0.100 -0.100 -0.142
(0.114) (0.096) (0.096) (0.072) (0.067) (0.098)
round 2 -0.948 -1.091 -1.037 -0.189 -0.189 -0.219
(0.819) (0.882) (0.872) (0.736) (0.731) (0.714)
round 3 -0.543 -0.921 -0.591 -0.574 -0.574 -0.390
(0.865) (1.005) (0.890) (0.887) (0.889) (0.931)
round 4 -0.200 -0.410 -0.316 -0.745 -0.745 -0.553
(0.620) (0.699) (0.660) (0.715) (0.720) (0.792)
round 5 -0.658 -1.065 -0.677 -0.764 -0.765 -0.629
(0.941) (0.879) (0.941) (0.741) (0.766) (0.831)
Friendship tie 2.447*** 1.198* -0.006 1.262
(0.884) (0.630) (1.217) (1.304)
Constant 6.671 6.282 6.919 5.836 5.837 5.317
(4.287) (4.094) (4.188) (4.088) (4.071) (4.265)
R2 0.539 0.571 0.550 0.492 0.492 0.499
Observations 130 130 130 140 140 140
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tie - non-sym. OR-tie - non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%,
respectively; robust standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by means of two-way
clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-symmetrized friendship ties used.
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C. Analysis with known dyads only
Table C.1: Determinants of sharing with village recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F - F 1.252* 1.599** 1.562** 1.582**
(0.650) (0.631) (0.627) (0.615)
M - F 2.099** 2.388*** 2.364*** 2.367***
(0.845) (0.883) (0.879) (0.880)
M - M 2.358*** 2.771*** 2.428*** 2.451**
(0.890) (0.944) (0.929) (0.966)
Give stranger 0.459*** 0.450*** 0.457*** 0.453***
(0.081) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
Friendship tie 1.797** 1.232*
(0.780) (0.737)
Constant 4.655*** 3.189 2.938 2.992
(1.283) (2.601) (2.533) (2.582)
R2 0.417 0.468 0.483 0.479
Observations 275 263 263 263
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Tie - - non-sym. OR-tie
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1,
5, and 10%, respectively; robust standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained
by means of two-way clustering at the level of dictators and recipients. Non-
symmetrized friendship ties used. Only pairs used in which the dictator knows
the recipient
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D. Additional analyses with OR-ties
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Figure D.1: Sharing by social proximity (OR-ties)
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Table D.1: Sharing by social proximity (OR-ties)
Panel a. stranger non-friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.18 57 9.32 231 0.794
men 9.22 27 10.15 100 0.195
women 9.13 30 8.69 131 0.589
Panel b. non-friend friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.32 231 10.80 54 0.099*
men 10.15 100 11.86 35 0.083*
women 8.69 131 8.84 19 0.922
Panel c. stranger friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.18 57 10.80 54 0.073*
men 9.22 27 11.86 35 0.013**
women 9.13 30 8.84 19 0.858
Notes: Wald-test which takes account of the multiple
decisions per dictator, by using a robust (lineariza-
tion) variance estimator. ***, **, * indicate two-sided
significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. OR-
ties used.
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